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Summary 
This report provides an overview of Egyptian politics and current issues in U. S .- 
Egyptian relations. It briefly provides a political history of modem Egypt, an 
overview of its political institutions, and a discussion of the prospects for 
democratization in Egypt. U.S.-Egyptian relations are complex and multi-faceted, 
and this report addresses the following current topics: the Arab-Israeli peace process, 
Iraq, terrorism, democratization and reform, human rights, trade, and military 
cooperation. This report will be updated regularly. 
U.S. policy on Egypt is aimed at maintaining regional stability, improving 
bilateral relations, continuing military cooperation, and sustaining the March 1979 
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Successive Administrations have long viewed Egypt 
as a leader and moderating influence in the Middle East, though in recent years, there 
have been increasing calls for Egypt to democratize. 
Congressional views of U.S.-Egyptian relations vary. Some lawmakers view 
Egypt as stabilizing the region and helping to extend U.S. influence in the most 
populous Arab country. Others would like the United States to pressure Egypt to 
implement political reforms, improve its human rights record, and take a more active 
role in reducing Arab-Israeli tensions. 
Among the current issues in U.S.-Egyptian relations are a shared concern about 
international terrorism. Egypt can claim some experience with the subject, having 
defeated domestic Islamist terrorists intent on overthrowing the government. As the 
war on terror continues, the United States relies on Egypt for intelligence 
cooperation. Egypt provided valuable support during Operation Enduring Freedom 
in Afghanistan. On the issue of Iraqi reconstruction, Egypt is helping to train Iraqi 
security forces and has offered to increase its efforts. Egypt and the United States 
agree on the importance of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the need to continue 
current Arab-Israel peace talks. In support of this process, Egypt has been training 
Palestinian police, and will send 750 Egyptian soldiers to the Egypt-Gaza border in 
order to prevent weapons smuggling following Israel's withdrawal from Gaza. 
The United States and Egypt disagree over the speed and depth of, but not the 
need for, some of Egypt's economic reforms. The two governments differ on Egypt's 
need to introduce democratic reforms, and many U.S. officials argue that Egypt is not 
moving quickly enough toward full democracy or in improving the human rights 
situation. Others caution that movement toward democracy carries a risk of 
establishment of an Islamist government. 
The United States has provided Egypt with an annual average of over $2 billion 
in economic and military foreign assistance since 1979. The United States will reduce 
Economic Support Funds (ESF) to about $400 million per year by 2008 in keeping 
with a plan to reduce aid to both Israel and Egypt. The Administration requested 
$495 million in economic grants and $1.3 billion in military grants for FY2006 for 
Egypt. 
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Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations 
Most Recent Developments 
0 On September 7, 2005, Egypt conducted its first multi-candidate 
presidential election, resulting in the reelection of President Hosni 
Mubarak with 88% of the vote. For a complete overview of the 
election, see CRS Report RS22274, Egypt: 2005 Presidential and 
Parliamentary Elections, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 
Historical Background 
Egypt During the Colonial Era 
Egypt's relations with the West, including its current friendly relations with the 
United States, are colored by a long history of foreign intervention in Egyptian 
politics, which has made Egypt, along with other Arab states, wary of outside 
influences on their domestic affairs. In the century, Egypt was a semi- 
autonomous province in the Ottoman Empire, which by then was in decline and 
being propped up by the British in order to serve as a buffer between it and Czarist 
Russia. At the time, Egypt was viewed as extremely valuable to the British and 
French empires and was prized for its agricultural output, large domestic market, and 
strategic location between the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Most importantly, the 
British saw Egypt as vital to securing the sea route to its most prized colony, India. 
Ottoman weakness led its Sultans to grant Europeans certain legal protections and 
economic advantages in Egypt, which stifled the Egyptian economy by flooding it 
with European manufactured goods, driving local merchants out of business.' Over 
time, Egypt developed a "cash crop" economy based almost solely on the export of 
cotton, the price of which constantly fluctuated, leaving the economy vulnerable and 
dependent on good harvests. Without a strong, diverse economy, Egypt could not 
generate enough capital to h n d  its modernization, leading it to become even more 
financially dependent on the West, as it rulers borrowed huge sums from European 
banks. Six years after the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869, Egypt was forced 
to sell all of its shares in the Suez Canal Company, which operated the Canal, in 
order to make payments on its foreign-owned debt. When Egypt could no longer pay 
' Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, Egypt: A Country Study, accessible at 
[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frdlcs/egtoc.html]. 
its debts, the British and French became directly involved in Egyptian politics - a 
trend that would continue until the mid 20th c e n t ~ r y . ~  
The Constitutional Monarchy & the British 
Britain unilaterally declared Egyptian independence in 1922, and for the next 
three decades, political power in Egypt was contested among three main actors: the 
British, the Egyptian monarchy, and the nationalist Wafd party, which was the 
driving force behind the Egyptian independence movement after World War I. 
Thousands of British troops remained stationed near the Suez Canal, and British 
officials served in the Egyptian ministries. Egypt's king could appoint a government 
and dismiss parliament, but ultimately relied on the British for support. The Wafd 
party dominated parliamentary elections during Egypt's experiment with 
parliamentary democracy (1922-1 %2), though the Wafd gradually began to lose 
Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798. The British invaded in 1882 and established a de facto 
protectorate. They would keep a sizeable military force in Egypt until the 1950s. 
Nasser and Egypt During the Cold War 
By the early 1950s, anti-British sentiment in Egypt had sparked civil unrest, 
allowing a cabal of Egyptian Army officers, known as the Free Officers Movement, 
to oust the king in what is referred to as the July 1952 revolution. The Free Officer 
Movement ushered in an era of military involvement in Egyptian politics, as all of 
Egypt's presidents in the post-revolutionary period have been high ranking officers. 
In the aftermath of the coup, Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser, the most charismatic of 
the Free Officers, succeeded in gaining total control over the government. Nasser 
abolished the monarchy and outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood (1954), which at the 
time was the only potential rival for power. Nasser would rule Egypt until his death 
in 1970. 
During the Nasser era, Egypt found itself at the center of superpower 
competition for influence in the Middle East. Wary of taking sides, Nasser managed, 
for a short period, to steer Egypt clear of either the Soviet or Western "camp" and 
was instrumental in helping to establish the non-aligned movement. U.S.-Egyptian 
relations soured when Nasser turned to the Soviets and the Czechs in 1955 for 
military training and equipment after the West, frustrated by Nasser's repeated 
rejections and his support of Algerian independence against the French, refksed to 
provide Egypt with defense assistance. A year later, following a U.S.-British decision 
to retract an offer of economic assistance and help for the construction of the Aswan 
Dam, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company to use its revenues to finance the 
dam project. (Egypt owned the Suez Canal, but the British-French company operated 
the Canal, and collected the revenues from which it paid a small rent to Egypt.) In 
October 1956, Israel, France, and Britain invaded Egypt - - Israel to stop Palestinian 
guerrillas from using Egypt as a base for operations against Israel, and France and 
Britain to occupy the Canal. President Eisenhower persuaded the three countries to 
withdraw from Egypt in early 1957, which briefly improved U.S.-Egyptian  relation^.^ 
After the 1956 Suez War, Nasser's popularity soared, as he came to embody 
Arab nationalism in the post-colonial era. Nasser did not hesitate to brandish his 
newfound authority and developed a muscular Egyptian foreign policy that attempted 
to destabilize pro-Westem governments in Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, support 
Palestinian guerrilla action against Israel, create a unified Arab state by merging 
briefly with Syria (the United Arab Republic 1958- 196 l), and intervene against the 
Saudi-backed royalists in the Yemeni civil war.4 However, Egypt's defeat at the 
hands of Israel in the June 1967 War and other setbacks temporarily deflated 
Nasser's popularity and crushed his ambitions to spread a pan-Arab ideology across 
the region. 
On the domestic front, Nasser turned Egypt into a socialist dictatorship with 
absolute power in the hands of the President. All banks and commercial firms were 
M.E. Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War, London: Longman, 1991, p. 409. 
During the Yemeni Civil War of 1963 through 1967, Egypt reportedly used mustard bombs 
in support of South Yemen against Saudi-backed royalist troops in North Yemen. See 
Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Egypt Special Weapons Guide, available online 
at [http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/index.html]. 
nationalized, large landowning estates were broken up into much smaller parcels and 
held in a state trust, and all political parties were banned. The precursor to the present 
National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed by Nasser in 1962 and was called the 
Arab Socialist Union. It served as the Egyptian republic's first mass party and an 
extension of the ruling elite. Other movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, 
were forced to go underground, as Nasser arrested thousands of Brotherhood activists 
after a failed Brotherhood assassination attempt against him in 1954.5 
Egypt-Israeli Peace 
After Nasser's death in 1970, Anwar Sadat, one of the original Free Officers, 
became President of Egypt. At the time, Egypt was humiliated by its defeat in the 
June 1967 War and the ensuing loss of the Sinai Peninsula to Israel. In addition, 
military rebuilding expenditures were absorbing nearly 25% of Egypt's gross 
domestic product. Under these circumstances, Sadat calculated that a military victory 
was needed to boost his own legitimacy and improve Egypt's position in any hture 
negotiations with Israel. The October 1973 War, which initially took Israel by 
surprise, was costly for both sides, but succeeded in boosting Sadat's credibility with 
the Egyptian people, enabling him to embark on a path which would ultimately sever 
Egypt's ties to the Soviet Union and bring it closer to the West. 
In November 1973, Egypt and the United States restored diplomatic relations 
(which had been cut off in 1967) and, in December, the two countries participated in 
the Geneva peace conference. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's shuttle 
diplomacy led to Egyptian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreements in 
1974 and a second set ofEgyptian-Israeli disengagements in 1975. The United States 
resumed economic aid to Egypt in 1975 after an eight-year hiatus. 
The United States endorsed Anwar al-Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem in 
November 1977, and President Jimmy Carter assisted in the Israeli-Egyptian peace 
negotiations at Camp David in September 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty 
of March 1 979.6 The United States helped organize the peacekeeping mission along 
the Egyptian-Israeli border, the Multi-National Force and Observers (MFO), and still 
maintains a rotating infantry task force as part of it.' 
One of the Brotherhood activists arrested was Sayyid Qutb, a writer and former 
government official whose writings provided a philosophical foundation for Islamic 
radicalism. Qutb spent years in prison and, after being briefly released in 1964, was 
rearrested and hanged in 1966. See Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred 
Terror, New York: Random House, 1966, p. 62. 
A copy of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is available online from MidEast Web 
Gateway at [http://www.mideastweb.org/egyptisraeltreaty.htm]. 
The MFO is an independent (non-UN) peacekeeping mission, created as a result of the 
1979 peace treaty. The MFO's expenses are funded in equal parts by Egypt, Israel, and the 
United States with additional contributions from Germany, Japan, and Switzerland. For 
more information on the MFO, see [http://www.mfo.org/Default.asp?bhcp=1]. 
Egypt Under Mubarak 
Sadat's rule came to an abrupt end in 1981, when he was assassinated during a 
military parade in Cairo by soldiers who also belonged to the Jamaah Islamiyah 
(Islamic Group) and A1 Jihad, the more radical offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Hosni Mubarak, Sadat's Vice President and former commander of the Egyptian Air 
Force, immediately ascended to the presidency and has remained in office to the 
present day. Under Mubarak, Egypt has continued to maintain good relations with the 
United States, as evident in Egypt's 1991 decision to join the allied coalition against 
Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert Storm. Following the path laid out by Sadat, 
Egypt has remained at peace with Israel, although critics have characterized this as 
a "cold peace." Mubarak has made a number of attempts to serve as a broker for 
Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, most notably in 1999 and 2000, when Egypt hosted 
the signing of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement for implementing past commitments 
and meetings between then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former 
Palestine President Yasir Arafat respectively. During the Mubarak era, the ongoing 
conflict between Egyptian Islamists and the Egyptian authorities continued, 
culminating in a period (1 992- 1997) of violent confrontations between Islamic 
militants and Egyptian police. 
After the September 1 1, 200 1, terrorist attacks and the ensuing U.S. focus on 
promoting democracy in the Middle East, the Mubarak regime has come under 
increasing U.S. pressure to accelerate political reforms and make Egypt more 
democratic. In an effort to control the reform agenda without relinquishing their gnp 
on power, Mubarak and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) have instituted 
some political reforms, while emphasizing the need for economic growth as a 
precondition for democratic change. In 2005, Mubarak proposed to alter the 
constitution to allow for multi-candidate presidential elections. The proposal was 
approved by parliament and then confirmed without opposition in a nationwide 
referendum. 
Regime Structure 
Overview 
Since the 1952 revolution, Egypt 
has officially been a republic, and its 
political system has developed some 
aspects of a democracy, though most 
observers continue to describe Egypt as 
an authoritarian regime dominated by a 
strong executive, who draws his 
support from the ruling National 
Democratic Party (NDP) and the 
military. Under the 197 1 Constitution, 
authority is vested in an elected 
president who must stand for reelection 
Egypt at a Glance 
Population: 77 million (est.) 
GDP per Capita: $1,100 - $1,400 
Religions: 90% Sunni Muslim 
10% Coptic Christian 
Literacy Rate: 57% (47% female) 
Unemployment Rate: 15-20% (est.) 
External Debt: $33 billion 
(as % of GDP) 37.8% 
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency World 
Factbook 2005. 
every six years.8 The President appoints the cabinet, who in turn draft and submit 
legislation to the legislature, the People's Assembly (lower house) and the Shura 
Council (upper house). The People's Assembly debates legislation proposed by 
government ministries and calls for amendments to government-sponsored bills but 
rarely initiates its own bills. The Shura Council is an advisory body, offering reports 
and recommendations on important subjects, but the Shura Council does not 
introduce, consider, or vote on legislation. Overall, analysts consider Egypt's 
legislative branch to be weak; the ruling party constitutes an overwhelming majority. 
In the People's Assembly, 444 members are elected and ten are appointed by the 
President; 176 members of the Shura Council are elected and 88 are appointed. One 
half of the elected members of the People's Assembly and the Shura Council must 
be farmers and laborers (Art. 87 and Art. 196 of the Constitution). People's 
Assembly members are elected for five-year terms, and Shura Council members for 
six-year terms (one-half the Council members are elected every three years). The 
ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) won 388 seats in the October-November 
2000 People's Assembly elections, independents won 37 seats (17 of whom were 
Muslim Brotherhood supporters), the Wafd Party won 7, Tagarnmu ("Rally") won 
6, the Nasserites won 3, and al-Ahrar won one seat. NDP members won 74 of the 88 
seats contested in the MayIJune 2001 Shura Council election, with independents 
winning the other 14 seats. Religious parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, are 
banned. 
Presidential Succession. Under Egyptian law, if the President should 
become incapacitated, the Speaker of the People's Assembly becomes the interim 
President until the People's Assembly can nominate a new President and the name 
can be submitted to the people in a referendum. A Vice President plays no special 
role in the transition, but in practice, recent Egyptian Presidents were succeeded by 
their Vice Presidents. The health of 76-year old President Hosni Mubarak, who has 
not named a Vice President, has been questioned. Some analysts believe that 
Egyptian intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, who has recently been an interlocutor 
between Palestinians and Israelis, could be a potential successor to Mubarak. Others 
consider A m  Moussa, the Secretary General of the Arab League, immensely popular 
with the Egyptian people and a potential rival to President Mubarak. Over the past 
several years, Mubarak's forty-one year old son, Garnal, increasingly has become 
involved at the highest levels of the NDP, though President Mubarak has denied 
rumors that he is grooming his son to succeed him.9 
The Role of the Military in Egyptian Society. Although military officers 
no longer play a direct role in the affairs of the civilian-run Egyptian government, the 
military is the preeminent institution in Egyptian society, and has been called on by 
In 1980, the Constitution was amended to allow the President to run for an unlimited 
number of terms, rather than one as was stipulated in the 197 1 Constitution. An English 
language version of the Constitution is available at [http://www.parliament.gov.eg/EPA/ 
edsecti0ns.j sp?typeID= 1 &levelid=54&parentlevel=6&levelno=2]. 
"Mubarak: Comments on Son's Successioninaccurate,"Daily Star (Beirut), May 16,2005. 
successive governments to maintain internal security and regime stability. l o  From an 
economic standpoint, the military also provides employment and social services for 
hundreds of thousands of young people in a country with annual double digit 
unemployment rates. Military experts have often asserted that Egypt's armed forces 
are bloated and maintain manpower at unnecessary levels for peacetime. In response, 
Egyptian officials and some scholars assert that the large size of Egypt's military is 
justified based on the services it provides to soldiers and their families. Some 
estimate that the military trains 12% of young Egyptian males and that Egypt's 
defense industries employ over 100,000 people." The Egyptian military has its own 
companies, which produce consumer products, pharmaceuticals, and manufactured 
goods. The Egyptian officer corps also benefit from higher salaries, better housing, 
and high quality healthcare, which help ensure their loyalty to the government. Some 
members of the opposition have criticized these special benefits and the military's 
fiscal autonomy, asserting that there is little civilian control over the military's 
budget. 
The National Democratic Party (NDP).I2 As the ruling party, the NDP 
dominates the political scene in Egypt, controlling well over 80% of the seats in 
parliament. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, popular dissatisfaction with the 
status quo led to the defeat of many NDP incumbents, though the party maintained 
its supra-majority in parliament after a number of "independents" who had been NDP 
members rejoined the party. Thereafter, NDP officials embarked on a campaign to 
improve the party's public image, holding the first party congress in ten years in 
2002. Since then, the NDP has held conferences in each successive year, touting a 
number of political reforms under the slogan of "new thinking." More importantly, 
the President's son, Gamal Mubarak, was appointed to the NDP's higher policy 
council, and other young reformers have become more visible in the party. Many 
analysts speculate that the NDP is undergoing a generational struggle between an 
"old guard" linked to tradition and deliberate change and young reformers who want 
rapid, far-reaching change. Others believe that even if a "new guard" were to gain 
control of the party, they would make no dramatic departures from previous NDP 
policies. 
The Judiciary. Although Articles 64 and 65 of the Constitution guarantee the 
independence of the judiciary, the state continues to hold sway over most judges and 
courts.I3 However, many analysts consider this branch of government to hold the 
most potential for exercising greater "checks and balances" on the regime. 
lo In 1986, President Mubarak called on the military to put down riots in Cairo, sparked by 
the protests of Central Security conscripts who were angry with their low pay and poor 
working conditions. The military also was deployed in 1977 during riots over a temporary 
reduction in food subsidies. 
" Irnad Harb, "The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?" The 
Middle East Journal, Washington: Spring 2003. vol. 57, Iss. 2; pg.269. 
l2 The NDP's website is available at [http://www.ndp.org.eg/index-en.htm]. 
l 3  According to Egyptian law #47 (1 972), the Egyptian Justice Ministry controls the pay and 
promotion scales for judges, thereby malung many judges hesitant to rule against the 
government out of concern for their own careers and livelihoods. 
Opposition Parties & Movements 
Political opposition in Egypt is divided among legal opposition parties approved 
by the government, the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, considered the most powerfd 
opposition force, and a small array of new movements, such as Kefaya ("Enough"), 
composed of civil society activists, academics, and intellectuals. By law, political 
parties must be approved by the seven-member Political Parties Committee (PPC). 
Since 1977, the Committee has approved 18 political parties and rejected almost 50. 
The current make-up of the PPC consists of the Shura Council chairman, three 
former senior judges, and the ministers of interior, parliamentary affairs and justice. 
In September 2004, NDP officials announced plans to amend the 1977 political 
parties law by adding three non-partisan public figures to the committee, though its 
members would still be chosen by the President. 
Legal Opposition Parties 
Most experts regard Egypt's legal opposition parties as divided with limited 
popular support. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, the principal opposition parties 
securedjust 17 seats, despite widespread popular dissatisfaction with the ruling NDP. 
Most recognized opposition parties publish their own newspapers, which frequently 
criticize the government and often expose human rights abuses. Most parties receive 
government subsidies and, in some cases, subsidies from foreign interests. 
The Al Ghad Party (Tomorrow) & Ayman Now. In November 2004, the 
Political Parties Committee approved the registration of a new political party called 
the Al-Ghad (Tomorrow) Party. Al-Ghad is a liberal party that promotes women's 
rights, secularism, and democratic reforms. On January 29, 2005, Egyptian 
authorities arrested Ayrnan Nour, the co-founder of Al-Ghad and member of the 
Peoples' Assembly, allegedly for forging names on petitions required to get the party 
authorized. Nour was released from jail on March 12 and finished second with 7% 
of the vote in Egypt's first multi-candidate presidential election on September 7, 
2005. Analysts note that if Egypt held early presidential elections before 2009, under 
current law, Nour would be ineligible to run since a political party must have been 
registered for five years in order to field a candidate in a presidential election. As 
previously mentioned, Al-Ghad was registered in 2004. 
Nour's trial in Egyptian criminal court was postponed after only a few days of 
deliberations and is scheduled to resume in late September 2005. During the 
campaign, his opponents labeled him as a "U.S. agent," though during a recent 
speech Nour reportedly remarked that "we can be for democracy and against the 
United States."14 During her June 2005 visit to Egypt, U.S. Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice met with Nour and his supporters together with representatives of 
other opposition parties.I5 
- 
l4 "Egyptian Revel in Power of Dissent," Chicago Tribune, May 1 ,  2005. 
l 5  "Rice Observes Limits On Middle East Trip," Washington Post, June 24, 2005. 
The Muslim Brotherhood 
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was founded in Egypt in 1928 to turn Egypt 
away from secularism and toward an Islamic government based on Sharia (religious) 
law and Muslim principles.'6 The Muslim Brotherhood operates as a religious 
charitable and educational institution, having been banned as a political party in 
1954; however, many Muslim Brotherhood members run for parliament as 
independents. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, 17 independent candidates, who 
were regarded as Brotherhood sympathizers, were elected. Over the years, the 
Egyptian government has alternated between tolerating and suppressing the Muslim 
Brotherhood, sometimes arresting and jailing its members, and other times allowing 
its members to operate almost without hindrance. 
Many foreign observers agree that the organization has renounced the use of 
violence as a political tactic, while many Egyptian officials continue to perceive the 
Brotherhood as a threat and are unwilling to legalize the movement. In the West, the 
issue of whether or not to recognize the Muslim Brotherhood as a legitimate political 
actor continues to perplex policymakers, particularly after the September 1 1, 200 1 
terrorist attacks. On the one hand, there has been a general reluctance to push for 
Islamist inclusion in politics, out of concern that, once in power, groups such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood will pursue policies counter to Western interests in the region 
or will transform states into theocracies. On the other hand, some experts believe that 
if these groups are not brought into the political mainstream, they will eventually 
resort to violence out of fmstration. 
Most analysts believe that, from an organizational standpoint, the Brotherhood 
is the only movement capable of mobilizing significant opposition to the government, 
though opinions vary on how much mass support the Brotherhood commands. As is 
typical for Islamist groups across the region, the Muslim Brotherhood is strongest 
among the professional middle class, controlling many of the professional syndicates 
(associations), including those representing engineers, doctors, lawyers and 
academics. I 7  
The Egyptian Movement for Change - Kefaya (Enough) 
In December 2004, a group of political activists, most of whom are secular in 
orientation and hail from Egyptian universities, formed the Egyptian Movement for 
Change, or what has been referred to in Arabic as Kefaya (enough), their primary 
slogan which refers to their opposition to a further term for President Mubarak. Since 
its formation, the movement has held a number of small demonstrations, and some 
of the group's members have been detained. In May 2005, female Kefaya activists 
l6  The Muslim Brotherhood is generally considered as the parent organization for 
Brotherhood branches throughout the Middle East region. Former Brotherhood members 
also have formed a number of radical and extremist off-shoots, including Hamas. See Gilles 
Kippel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002, 
p.151. 
l 7  John Walsh, "Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood," Harvard International Review, Cambridge: 
Winter 2003, vol. 24, iss.4; p.32. 
accused Egyptian police officers of sexually assaulting female protesters, which led 
to widespread condemnation of the government by both secular and Islamic 
opposition forces. Kefaya, which encompasses a mix of opposition groups, 
boycotted the 2005 presidential election. 
Civil Society in Egypt 
Although political opposition continues to be stymied, observers note that, over 
the past two decades, Egypt has developed a vibrant civil society, which some 
development experts hope will firther democratization in the country. The term 
"civil society" generally refers to the growing number of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), charities, and advocacy groups that openly operate in 
Egyptian society. Many of these groups pursue so-called "safe issues," such as 
women's rights, human rights, and social equality, as a way to work toward the much 
broader goal of democratization. Often times, the Egyptian government has created 
its own associations in order to boost its reform image at home and abroad, such as 
the government-sponsored National Council on Human Rights. 
In Egypt, NGOs are required to apply for legal status and, according to 
Association Law 84-2003, NGOs must be registered with the Ministry of Social 
Affairs. There are an estimated 16,000 registered civic organizations in Egypt. In 
some cases, it may take years before the ministry rules on an application, and many 
groups are routinely rejected. If an NGO's application is rejected, it has few legal 
rights and can be shut down. Its members can be imprisoned. However, even 
registered NGOs must tread carefully when engaging in sensitive political issues, as 
some groups have been periodically closed or have had their legal status revoked. 
NGO's also must report all foreign donations to the Ministry of Social Affairs. 
Overall, tolerance for the activities of non-registered groups varies, and many NGOs 
operate without any legal protection.18 
Saad al-Din Ibrahim. In 2001, authorities closed the internationally- 
recognized Egyptian NGO known as the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development 
Studies and arrested its director, Saad al-Din Ibrahim, a sociology professor at 
American University of Cairo. Ibrahim, who also holds U.S. citizenship, was arrested 
for defaming Egypt by describing discrimination against Coptic Christians and for 
not reporting a foreign donation from the European Union for a voter education 
project. The international community condemned Ibrahim's detention and conviction, 
and the United States threatened to withhold Egypt's foreign aid if Ibrahim wasn't 
released. On March 18, 2003, an Egyptian court acquitted Ibrahim, and he was 
released. Analysts note that Ibrahim is not a popular figure in Egyptian politics but 
is respected at home and abroad for his work to promote reform. During the 
September 2005 presidential election, Ibrahim helped organize election monitors to 
observe the voting process and report violations. 
l8 Human Rights Watch, "Margins of Repression: State Limits on Nongovernmental 
Organization Activism," July 2005. Available online at [http://hnv.org/english/docs/ 
2005/07/04/egypt112 17.htmI. 
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Current Issues in U.S.-Egyptian Relations 
2005 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections 
On September 7, 2005, Egypt conducted its first multi-candidate presidential 
election, resulting in the reelection of President Hosni Mubarak with 88% ofthe vote. 
Although some have credited Egypt for holding a competitive election, many have 
criticized the outcome and alleged fraud. President Bush had called for international 
monitoring of the election, which was subsequently rejected by Egypt. The 
Administration has reiterated its call for international monitoring of parliamentary 
elections this fall. For a complete overview of the presidential election and its 
implications for U.S. policy toward Egypt and U.S. efforts to promote democracy in 
the region, see CRS Report RS22274, Egypt: 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary 
Elections, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 
Ara b-Israel i Peace 
The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty has served as the basis for good relations 
between Egypt and the United States. Although Israel and Egypt have maintained 
cool relations since then, both parties have maintained the peace, and the United 
States has continued to underwrite the "costs" of peace by providing high amounts 
of annual economic and military aid to both parties. One "cost" for Egypt was the 
diplomatic isolation it suffered following the peace treaty. In 1979, Egypt was 
expelled from the Arab League, an organization it had helped found.19 At the time, 
the rest of the Arab world had felt betrayed by Egypt for making a separate peace 
with Israel. 
Despite the treaty, the development of close economic, political, and diplomatic 
relations between Israel and Egypt has been limited since 1979. Although there have 
been some initiatives in recent years, such as President Mubarak's attendance at the 
funeral for former Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and recent energy cooperation 
 agreement^,^' overall relations remain cool. In 1995, relations were strained when 
Egypt advocated Israeli signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Tensions 
arose again when Egypt withdrew its ambassador to Tel Aviv in November 2000 to 
protest Israeli actions against the Palestinians at the start ofthe latest intifada. Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon sent two envoys to Cairo shortly after his February 6, 2001 
election, reportedly to request the return of the Egyptian ambassador and to seek 
Egyptian assistance in moderating Arab League reactions to Israeli policies. Egypt 
announced that it would return its ambassador to Tel Aviv at the February 8, 2005 
Palestinian-Israeli summit meeting at Sham al-Shaykh. 
l9 Egypt was readmitted to the Arab League in 1989 during a period of renewed international 
interest in Arab-Israeli peace. 
20 In June 2005, Egypt and Israel signed a long-delayed $2.5 billion agreement on sales of 
Egyptian natural gas to Israel. Under the terms of the agreement, Israeli state-owned utility 
Israel Electric Corp will purchase gas from Eastern Mediterranean Gas (EMG), a private 
Israeli-Egyptian firm. A pipeline from Egypt to Israel is being built. 
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Most experts believe that progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is the 
key to improved Egyptian-Israeli relations, as well as Israel's wider relationships with 
the Arab world. h light of the continued stalemate on the peace process, President 
Mubarak has attempted to act as a broker, advisor, messenger, and arbitrator in the 
hopes of galvanizing both sides to take the necessary risks for peace. In addition, 
Egypt's intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, has met with Hamas and Palestinian 
Authority figures in order to secure ceasefire arrangements with Israel. Since the 
resumption of negotiations in the early 1990s, Egypt has taken the following major 
actions to support the peace process, among other steps: 
0 Endorsed the Declaration of Principles signed by the PLO and Israel 
in Washington on September 13, 1993; 
0 Hosted the September 4, 1999 Sham al-Shaykh signing of an 
Israeli-Palestinian agreement for implementing past commitments; 
0 Hosted the meetings between then Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright and Palestine President Arafat at Sham al-Shaykh on 
October 4, 2000, and also hosted the Arab League meetings that 
began on October 2 1 ; and 
0 Hosted the February 8,2005 meeting between Israeli Prime Minister 
Sharon and Palestinian President Abbas at Sham al-Shaykh. 
Egypt's Role in the Gaza Withdrawal. Israel unilaterally dismantled its 
settlements and withdrew its troops from the Gaza Strip in August and September 
2005. In order to facilitate a smooth transition and take an active role in Israeli- 
Palestinian peace, Egypt offered to post border guards on the Gaza-Egyptian border, 
increase its efforts to reorganize and train Palestinian security forces, and halt 
smuggling of contraband into Gaza. After extensive negotiations with Israeli 
officials, Egypt is deploying 750 soldiers to secure "the Philadelphi Route," a strip 
of land in Egypt immediately adjacent to the Gaza Strip that is notorious for tunnels 
used for smuggling weapons and narcotics. The memorandum of understanding 
between Israel and Egypt delineates the type of equipment the Egyptians may use 
(small arms and jeeps, no heavy armor) and the length of the patrol area (14km on 
the ground and 3 km into the sea).2' Most importantly, Egypt is said to have 
promised not to provide weapons to Palestinian forces in order to allay Israeli 
concerns that such weapons may be used in terrorist attacks. 
After the last Israeli soldiers withdrew, Egyptian border guards began allowing 
some Gazans to cross the border into Egypt despite Israeli calls for the temporary 
closing of the border. Reports indicate that there was an initial surge in Palestinians 
crossing and that Egyptian officials may have been reluctant to enforce a strict 
closure of the border for fear of sparking a violent confrontation. Egyptian and 
Palestinian officials reportedly have agreed to reclose the border after a few days. 
21 For a summary of the Israeli-Egyptian border agreement, see [http://www.washington 
institute.org/templateC05 .php?CID=2374]. 
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Egyptian officials share the opinion of other governments in the region that the 
unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza should be the first step toward a general 
withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Palestinian territory. The Egyptians and others 
point out that Israeli withdrawal is called for in U.N. resolutions, particularly 242, 
and the recent "Road Map" approach to peace, and that many Israelis also favor 
withdrawal. Egyptian leaders believe that the United States should be less inclined 
to accept and support Israeli positions and more inclined to support what they view 
as an even handed approach that will ensure Palestinian rights. Egyptians also point 
out that the Road Map calls for Israel to stop building and expanding settlements in 
the occupied territories, and argue that the United States should be more forceful in 
compelling Israel to meet those commitments. 
Depiction of Israel and Jews in the Egyptian Media. Egypt, like other 
Arab states, has received much criticism for allowing state-owned media outlets to 
publish unsubstantiated conspiratorial theories regarding Israel and the Jewish 
people, which likely contribute to detrimental or negative views of Israel by the 
Egyptian people. Although some Egyptian intellectuals have called for an end to anti- 
Israeli incitement, Egyptian publications continue to publish stories that perpetuate 
allegations of Jewish involvement in blood libels, deny the existence of the 
Holocaust, and portray anti-Semitic publications, such as the Protocols of the Elders 
of Zion, as U.S. officials and Members of Congress have urged the Egyptian 
government to speak out against anti-Semitism in media and society. Egyptian 
officials claim that they do not control the "free press." 
l raq 
Egyptian Position on the 2003 Iraq War. The Egyptian public's 
opposition to the Iraq war precluded the government from publicly supporting the 
United States. Egypt advised against the March 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq and 
continues to question an extended presence of U.S. forces there. In response to U.S. 
efforts to secure Arab participation in stabilizing Iraq, Egypt informed the United 
States that it would not participate in any international security arrangements 
involving force deployments in Iraq unless they were under United Nations 
auspices.23 In the past, Egypt did cooperate with U.S.-led international military and 
peacekeeping operations, such as the 1991 Kuwaiti liberation, Operation Restore 
Hope in Somalia, Afghani~tan,~~ and the Balkans. Egypt has allowed U.S. overflights 
and waived the 30-day prior notification to pass nuclear-armed U.S. warships through 
the Suez canal. At a June 2005 conference on Iraq reconstruction, Iraqi Foreign 
Minister Hoshyar Zebari announced that Egypt and Jordan were the first Arab 
countries sending ambassadors to Iraq. In July2005, Egypt's top diplomat in Iraq was 
kidnaped by terrorists and executed several days later. 
22  For a report on instances of anti-Semitism in Egypt, see the Anti-Defamation League's 
website at [http://www.adl.org/main~Arab~World~default.htm]. 
23 "Friction Over Egypt's Role in Regional Issues Strains Relations With U.S.," Washington 
Post, May 25, 2003. 
24 In helping to rebuild Afghanistan , Egypt built a field hospital at Bagram Air Base. It has 
declined to send peacekeeping forces there. 
Training Iraqi Security Forces. Egypt has been active in helping to train 
Iraq's new security forces, and some U.S. lawmakers have demanded that the 
Administration further utilize Egypt's offer of a s~ i s t ance .~~  In late 2004, an Iraqi 
infantry company was invited to Egypt to participate in a joint training program with 
the Egyptian army. According to the Egyptian government, 134 soldiers from Iraq's 
5th Infantry Division trained alongside Egypt's 3rd Infantry Division at the Mubarak 
Military City in northern Egypt. No plans for future joint Iraqi-Egyptian training 
exercises have been announced, although Egyptian officials have expressed their 
willingness to expand their training program for Iraqi military officers.26 
Terrorism 
Egyptian security forces have long been engaged in their own war on terror 
against several radical Islamic groups, that have called for the violent overthrow of 
Egypt's secular government and its replacement with an Islamic state. Two radical 
offshoots of the aforementioned Muslim Brotherhood, the Jamaah Islamiya (Islamic 
Group) and A1 ~ihad,*' have been responsible for several attacks on high-ranking 
Egyptian officials, including A1 Jihad's 198 1 assassination of President Anwar Sadat 
and Jamaah Islamiya's 1990 killing of the speaker of the Egyptian People's 
Assembly. Both groups also have attacked tourist sites popular with Western visitors, 
bombed Coptic Christian churches, and attacked Egyptian banks and other centers 
of commerce. The Islamic Group also has a nonviolent arm which recruits and builds 
support openly in poor neighborhoods in Cairo, Alexandria, and throughout southern 
Egypt, and runs social service programs. A1 Jihad has operated only clandestinely, 
focusing almost exclusively on assassinations. 
1992 - 1997 Terror Campaign. Jamaah Islamiya began a terror campaign 
in 1992 that in six years resulted in 1,300 deaths (90 of whom were foreign tourists) 
and several thousand injuries. The group also assassinated several Egyptian officials. 
The government responded with an all-out campaign that included what some viewed 
as harsh measures that abused human rights. Egyptian authorities used arrest, search, 
and seizure without warrant, detention without trial, conviction without appeal, and, 
according to some, physical torture in their drive to stop the Jamaah terrorists. Some 
Egyptians defend the use of such measures as necessary to eliminate terrorists and 
stop terrorism from threatening an even larger segment of the Egyptian populace. 
President Mubarak and other Egyptian officials claimed that the extremists were 
financed, trained, and directed by Iranian and Sudanese religious militants and 
returning Egyptian volunteers from the Soviet-Afghan war. 
25 "Mubarak insists Palestinian, Iraqi Solutions Linked," Washington Times, April 14,2004. 
26 See CRS Report RL32105, Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Training, 
Peacekeeping, and Reconstruction, by Jeremy M. Sharp and Christopher M. Blanchard. 
27 Over a period of three decades following the 1952 revolution, there were a number of 
defections from the Muslim Brotherhood, which had chosen to work within the Egyptian 
political system after being crushed by former President Nasser. In the early 1970's, radicals 
broke away from the Brotherhood and formed Jamaah Islamiya (Islamic Group) and A1 
Jihad. 
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Jamaah leaders inside Egypt announced in 1997 and again in1 998 that they were 
ending the armed attacks.28 In the interim, six men claiming to be Jamaah members 
attacked tourists at the Hatshepsut tomb near Luxor in southern Egypt in November 
1997, killing 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians before committing suicide. 
Previously, Jamaah members involved in terror attacks tried to escape and did not 
commit suicide, which led to some speculation that the Luxor attack was the 
desperate act of a few members rather than an action of the whole group. There have 
been no major incidents involving Jamaah since the Luxor attack and in June 2000, 
Jamaah leaders inside Egypt repeated their claim that they had abandoned violence 
and terrorism. Some observers suggest that harsh and persistent police pressure has 
greatly reduced if not eliminated the Jamaah threat to Egypt. 
Recent Terrorist Activity in Egypt. Over the past two years, there has been 
a resumption of terrorist activity in Egypt, in what some suggest could be a revival 
of earlier, more violent periods. 
In October 2004, bombs exploded at two major resorts that cater to 
Israelis and other Western tourists in the Sinai peninsula, 34 people 
were killed and over 120 were wounded in the attack. 
On April 7,2005, an explosion in the Khan al-Khalili market area of 
Cairo killed three, including one U.S. citizen. A group called the al- 
Ezz Islamic Brigade claimed responsibility for the attack. 
On April 30, 2005, a man exploded a suicide bomb near the 
Egyptian museum while being pursued by police, wounding seven; 
and two women, the fianck and sister of the suicide bomber, fired at 
a tourist bus before committing suicide. No one was injured in the 
bus attack. Two groups claimed responsibility for the attacks, but 
neither claim was confirmed. 
On July 23,2005, two car bombs and a set of explosives concealed 
in a backpack exploded at various tourist destinations in the 
Egyptian resort town of Sham al-Shaykh. As many as 88 people, 
including one American, were killed in the blasts. Investigations into 
the attacks have focused on the possible link to a local terrorist cell 
who may have committed the October 2004 bombings. 
Egypt has suffered through a new wave of attacks emanating from previously 
unknown groups in the Sinai Peninsula. One group calling itselfthe Abdullah Azzam 
Brigades, named after a mentor of A1 Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, claimed 
responsibility for the October 2004 bombs attacks in Taba and the July 2005 attack 
in the Egyptian resort town of Sham al-Shaykh. After each attack, Egyptian 
28 Experts note that Jamaah and A1 Jihad members who fled Egypt never renounced the use 
of violence against the Egyptian government, as both groups ultimately merged with A1 
Qaeda. Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the leader of A1 Jihad, has long been known as A1 Qaeda's 
"second-in-command" to Osama bin Laden. See "Jihad Militant Leader Calls for Change 
to Nonviolence," Dow Jones Newswires, February 6, 2000. 
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authorities identified some of the perpetrators as members of local Bedouin tribes.29 
Egyptian security forces have launched several operations in the Sinai and have 
arrested hundreds of Bedouin suspects, leading some to speculate that police heavy- 
handedness may be further exacerbating tensions between Bedouin and the state. 
The extent of outside involvement in the recent wave of terrorism in Egypt is 
still uncertain. Some believe that the nature of the bombings, in which terrorists 
closely coordinated their actions against symbolic targets, suggests that A1 Qaeda or 
another international group emanating from the Sinai may have supported the 
Bedouin operatives. The recent failed attack against a U.S. naval vessel in Aqaba, 
Jordan was claimed to be carried out by the group known as A1 Qaeda in Iraq, which 
is led by known terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Some analysts have speculated that 
this attack is an indication that Zarqawi may be expanding his operations to target 
Arab regimes with close relations to the United States. Zarqawi's group has already 
claimed credit for the murder of an Egyptian diplomat and the bombing of a 
Jordanian diplomatic facility in Baghdad. Some Egyptian observers discount the 
possibility of outside involvement and believe that the Bedouin, who have 
historically kept their distance from the state, have grown frustrated with poor living 
conditions in the Sinai and sought revenge for the mass detentions that followed the 
October 2004 bombings. 
Status of Political and Economic Reform in Egypt 
Overview. Although there have been no fundamental political changes in 
Egypt for decades, recent developments and ongoing trends have led to increasing 
pressure on the government to reform and have called into question the durability of 
one-party rule in Egypt. Many analysts attribute this opening to the continued 
speculation over the health of 76-year old President Hosni Mubarak, the upcoming 
parliamentary elections and recent presidential election, popular dissatisfaction with 
the Mubarak regime, the government crackdown on militant Islamist groups over the 
past decade, and recent local and international calls for democratization in the Middle 
East. Some observers caution that the Egyptian ruling elite, which has embarked on 
its own program of economic reform, has a more limited vision for political 
liberalization than members of the opposition and many in the international 
community. 
Government-Driven Reform. In an effort to steer the reform agenda 
without relinquishing its grip on power, the National Democratic Party (NDP) has 
instituted some political reform measures, while emphasizing the need for economic 
growth as a precondition for democratic change. When pressed by outside observers 
dissatisfied with this approach, Egyptian officials warn of the potential for instability 
29 On August 1,2005, Egyptian police killed Mohamed Saleh Flayfil, a Bedouin and suspect 
in the Sham al-Shaykh bombings, during a shootout in his mountain hide-out 17 miles east 
of the Cairo-Suez highway. Police had been searching for Flayfil, 30, who also was wanted 
for bomb attacks last year at the Taba resorts in the Sinai. His brother, Suleiman Flayfil, was 
one of the Taba attackers who reportedly died in one of the explosions when he detonated 
his charges prematurely. The brothers were reportedly part of an extremist cell based in the 
Sinai town of El Arish. 
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brought about by rapid democratization, particularly if such a process empowered 
Islamists. Nevertheless, many Egyptian officials have realized the need to act on 
some fronts and have made some changes over the past few years. In 2003, the 
government passed legislation to establish the National Council of Human  right^,^' 
and to abolish hard labor as a penalty. In July 2004, President Mubarak reshuffled his 
cabinet, bringing in several young, reform-minded ministers in order to galvanize a 
moribund economy, which had contracted over the previous three years, particularly 
after the September 11 attacks. The new ministers, who hail from both the private 
sector and from academia, are colleagues of Gamal Mubarak. 
A significant recent development took place in May 2005, when, in a 
nationwide referendum, the Egyptian public approved a constitutional amendment 
to allow for multiple candidates in a presidential e le~t ion.~ '  For details on the 
amendment, see CRS Report RS22274, Egypt: 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary 
Elections, by Jeremy M. Sharp. 
Opposition Reform Plans. Opposition demands have included 
constitutional amendments for direct, competitive presidential elections and term 
limits, the lifting of the 24-year-old emergency laws which prohibit freedom of 
assembly, the loosening of government controls over unions and non-governmental 
organizations, freedom of the judiciary, and complete freedom of the press. 
Although the opposition has recently become more vociferous in its calls for 
real constitutional change, some analysts characterize political life as stagnant and 
note the strong disconnect between activist demands for reform and public support 
for democratic change. According to Arnr Hamzawy of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, "concepts such as democracy, good governance, and pluralism 
evoke, at least partially, distrust among the majority of Egyptian citizens because of 
the government's systematic misuse of these  principle^."^^ 
Economic Reform. As a developing country with the largest population (and 
the second largest economy) in the Arab world, Egypt faces a number of economic 
and environmental challenges, including a lack of arable land, high unemployment, 
rampant corruption, rapid urbanization, and extreme poverty (30% of the population 
lives below the poverty line). Egypt's economy revolves around several sectors: the 
state; the production of oil and natural gas; the tourism industry; remittances from 
over 2 million Egyptians working abroad; revenues from the Suez Canal; agriculture; 
clothing and textile manufacturing; pharmaceuticals; and foreign aid. Since the early 
30 The National Council on Human Rights recently published its first annual report, 
reportedly recommending abolishing the 1981 Emergency Laws and expressing concern 
about torture in prisons. See Arab Reform Bulletin, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, April 2005, Volume 3, Issue 3. 
31  Under the old law, one-third of the members of the People's Assembly nominated a 
person to be President, and two-thirds of the members confirmed the nominee, who then 
was placed on a ballot in a nationwide referendum for an up-or-down vote. 
32 Amr Hamzawy, "The Continued Cost of Political Stagnation in Egypt," Policy Outlook, 
Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
February 2005. 
CRS- 18 
years of Anwar Sadat's rule, Egypt has been evolving from a centrally controlled, 
socialist economy to a free market, capitalist society - a gradual process that has 
created difficult decisions for the Egyptian government, income inequality, and 
hardships for the Egyptian people.33 
In order to increase foreign investment and qualify for development loans from 
international lending institutions, Egypt has had to demonstrate that it is making 
tangible progress in liberalizing its economy. In recent years, the government has 
reduced public subsidies for basic foodstuffs, privatized many state-owned 
corporations, and removed trade Although analysts remain cautious as to 
what effect reforms may have on the economy, the government has recently 
streamlined the tax system, canceled many customs duties, and forced smaller banks 
to merge with the country's four largest banks. 
Corruption. Egypt, like other developing nations, has struggled to overcome 
high levels of corruption, which many analysts consider the biggest obstacle to 
achieving economic growth. Corruption in Egypt is found in all sectors of the 
government as, in recent years, a number of high level officials (including several 
former ministers) has been indicted for fraud and influence peddling. Moreover, 
Egypt's bloated, cumbersome bureaucracy is infamous for making bribery a common 
practice, as poorly-paid government workers seek additional money and citizens seek 
ways to circumvent the maze of public regulations and overlapping agencies. Some 
analysts believe that the corruption issue enhances the popularity of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which frequently invokes Islam to rally against the moral corruption in 
society. The Egyptian press also has been active in exposing corruption scandals. 
U.S. Policy to Promote Reform in Egypt. Although the United States has 
long advocated the promotion of human rights and political freedom in Egypt, most 
experts agree that, prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, economic 
reform superseded political reform in the West's relations with Egypt. However, 
with the recent push for democracy in the Middle East seen as a counterweight to 
Islamic militancy and intellectual and social stagnation, U.S. policy regarding Egypt 
has been reinvigorated, as policymakers seek to balance U.S. security interests with 
U.S. democracy promotion policies. 
Through annual foreign operations and State Department appropriations 
legislation, Congress provides hnding for reform in Egypt through the following 
programs: the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Egypt 
33 It is estimated that the public sector in Egypt still employs nearly a third ofthe population. 
See American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, Egypt Key Economic Indicators, online at 
[http://www.amcham.org.eg/BSAC/EconomicIndicators/EcIndicators.asp] . 
34 In 1977, there were mass demonstrations throughout Egypt following the government's 
decision to cut public subsidies on flour, rice, and cooking oil in order to demonstrate to 
international lenders, such as the International Monetary Fund, that Egypt was making 
necessary macroeconomic reforms. Over the course of two days, several hundred were killed 
and hundreds more arrested, as the Egyptian army was called into the streets to restore 
order. 
Office;35 the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) - a State Department program 
designed to encourage reform in Arab countries by strengthening Arab civil society, 
encouraging micro-enterprise, expanding political participation, and promoting 
women's rights;36 the State Department's Human Rights and Democracy Fund 
(HRDF) - an account which funds human rights promotion in Muslim-majority 
countries; and the National Endowment for Democracy's (NED) Muslim Democracy 
Program. 
Many in the Egyptian government appear to feel threatened by the current thrust 
of U.S. policy and resist some U.S. advocated changes that seek to empower 
opposition movements. Nevertheless, observers agree that President Bush's 
statements in support of democratic reform have prompted Egypt to pay more 
attention to the issue and, in some cases, take new steps toward reform. On June 20, 
2005, in a speech delivered at the American University in Cairo, Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice remarked: 
Now, here in Cairo, President Mubarak's decision to amend the country's 
constitution and hold multiparty elections is encouraging. President Mubarak has 
unlocked the door for change. Now, the Egyptian Government must put its faith 
in its own people. We are all concerned for the future of Egypt's reforms when 
peaceful supporters of democracy - men and women - are not free from 
violence. The day must come when the rule of law replaces emergency decrees 
- and when the independent judiciary replaces arbitrary justice. The Egyptian 
Government must fulfill the promise it has made to its people - and to the entire 
world - by giving its citizens the freedom to choose. Egypt's elections, 
including the Parliamentary elections, must meet objective standards that define 
every free election. Opposition groups must be free to assemble, and to 
participate, and to speak to the media. Voting should occur without violence or 
intimidation. And international election monitors and observers must have 
unrestricted access to do their jobs.37 
Congress also seeks to ensure that U.S. foreign assistance for Egypt is being 
appropriately used to promote reform. In conference report language accompanying 
P.L. 108-447, the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, conferees specified that 
"democracy and governance activities shall not be subject to the prior approval ofthe 
GoE [government of Egypt]. The managers intend this language to include NGOs 
and other segments of civil society that may not be registered with, or officially 
recognized by, the GoE. However, the managers understand that the GoE should be 
kept informed of funding provided pursuant to these a~tivities."~' 
35 For a list of USAID's democracy and good governance programs in Egypt, see the USAID 
website at [http:l/www.usaid-eg.org/]. 
36 It was recently reported that, for the first time, MEPI has issued several small grants to 
political activists and human rights organizations in Egypt. See "Tentative Steps: 
Democracy Drive By America Meets Reality in Egypt," Wall Street Journal, April 1 1,2005. 
37 "Remarks at the American University in Cairo, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, June 
20, 2005. The full text of the speech is available at [http:/lwww.state.gov/secretaryld 
2005/48328.htm]. 
38 Conference Report (H.Rept. 108-792) to accompany H.R. 4818, November 20,2004. 
U.S.-Egyptian Trade 
Trade Overview. The United States is Egypt's largest bilateral trading 
partner, while Egypt is the United States' 55th largest trading partner.39 According to 
the Department of Commerce's 2004 Country Commercial Guide for Egypt, Egypt 
is the largest single market worldwide for American wheat and is a significant 
importer of other agricultural commodities, machinery, and eq~ipment.~' The United 
States also is the second largest foreign investor in Egypt, primarily in the oil and gas 
sector. 
Since the mid-1990s, Egyptian officials have sought to negotiate a free trade 
agreement (FTA) with the United States, claiming that an Egyptian-American FTA 
could boost Egypt's economy by as much as 3%. The two parties signed a Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 1999. The TIFA established a Council 
on Trade and Investment (TIFA Council) composed of representatives of both 
governments and chaired by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and 
Egypt's Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade. In 1996, Congress authorized the 
creation of Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) in order to entitle goods jointly 
produced by Israel and either Jordan or Egypt to enter the United States duty free.41 
In December 2004, Egypt finally reached an agreement with Israel to designate 
several Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) in Egypt under the mandate pf the U.S.- 
Israeli Free Trade Agreement. 
Table 1. U.S.-Egyptian Trade Statistics 2004 
I Selected Commodities I $ Amount (Estimated) I 
U.S. Exports to Egypt 
Cereals 
Vehicles 1 $229 million I 
($3.1 billion total in 2004) 
$808 million 
Machinery 
Aircraft 
$5 14 million 
$350 million 
Mineral Fuel, Oil 1 $262 million I 
U.S. Imports from Egypt 
Apparel 
($1.3 billion total in 2004) 
$422 million 
39 The European Union is Egypt's largest multilateral trading partner. 
Iron & Steel 
' O  U S .  Department of Commerce, Egypt Country Commercial Guide FY2OO4, October 2003. 
$254 million 
41 See CRS Report RS22002, Qualified Industrial Zones in Jordan: A Model for Promoting 
Peace and Development in the Middle East? 
Source: Trade Stat Exprcss, U.S. Department of Commerce 
Human Rights, Religious Freedom, and Women's Rights 
Egypt consistently ranks poorly in its human rights record, as the U.S. State 
Department and international human rights organizations have long documented 
instances of torture, arbitrary detainment, and discrimination against women, 
homosexuals, and Coptic Christians. According to Human Rights Watch, Egyptian 
security forces and police routinely torture and mistreat detainees, particularly during 
interrogations. The government has long restricted freedom of assembly, though 
recent opposition protests have been permitted and, in some cases, police were absent 
from public demonstrations. The government also restricts free speech, as many 
newspapers are partially government-owned and tend to follow the government 
line.42 However, Arab satellite televisions, like A1 Jazeera and others, have 
challenged Egyptian state-owned media by broadcasting, among other programs, 
opposition demonstrations and interviews with Muslim Brotherhood members. 
The 1981 Emergency Laws. After Islamic militants assassinated former 
President Anwar Sadat in 198 1, officials reinstated a set of laws granting the state 
and security forces sweeping powers in order to curb the outbreak of firther violence. 
Over time, these laws, which were extended for three years in February 2003, have 
come under heavy scrutiny from reformers and human rights advocates for their 
arbitrary application to non-security cases. According to the 2004 State Department 
Report on Human Rights Practices in Egypt, the Emergency Laws: 
authorize incommunicado detention for prolonged periods, 
restrict or deny access to counsel for detainees in state security 
facilities, 
permit the state to refer any criminal case to the Emergency Courts, 
in which the accused does not receive most of the constitutional 
protections of the civilian judicial system, 
suspend the constitutional provisions regarding the right to privacy. 
Religious Freedom. There is no official government policy of discrimination 
against the 9 million Coptic Christians in Egypt, and the Constitution provides for 
equal rights without regard to religion. Nevertheless, critics note that there are no 
Christians serving as governors, police commissioners, city mayors, public university 
presidents, or deans.43 Converts to Christianity in Egypt may face bureaucratic 
obstacles in registering their new religious status with the state. In addition, there 
have been reports of periodic discrimination against small minority communities of 
Baha'is, Shiites, and Jews (200 remain in Egypt). In an effort to promote tolerance, 
President Mubarak in December 2003 recognized the Coptic Christmas, January 6, 
as a national holiday. 
Women's Rights. Although Egyptian women have played major roles in the 
country's drive for independence and many women currently serve in prestigious 
public posts, women face a number of obstacles at the legal, religious, and cultural 
42 Some Egyptian government-owned newspapers will voice anti-government opinions. 
43 Egypt's Minister of Finance, Yusef Boutros-Ghali, hails from a prominent Christian 
family. 
levels. For example, according to the U.S. State Department's 2004 Human Rights 
Report on Egypt, female genital mutilation (FGM) remained a serious problem due 
to widespread cultural acceptance, despite the government's attempts to eliminate the 
practice.44 Moreover, personal status laws governing marriage, divorce, custody, and 
inheritance discriminate against women, particularly when it comes to divorce, as 
there is much societal resistance to breaking up the family unit. Domestic violence 
also is a major issue, as some estimate that as many as a third of all married Egyptian 
women have faced some form of physical abuse.45 In recent years, new non- 
governmental organizations have started to provide services and counseling to 
women, who may be too afraid to go to the authorities. 
Military Cooperation 
"Bright Star" and other Joint Military Operations. The United States 
and Egypt conducted the first "Bright Star" joint military exercise in August 1983, 
and continue to hold periodic "Bright Star" exercises for infantry, airborne, artillery, 
and armored forces. The 1983 Bright Star was more than a training exercise: 
President Mubarak asked the United States to send Airborne Warning and Control 
System aircraft (AWACS) to monitor Libya's activity toward Sudan in February 
1983. President Reagan sent AWACS planes and crews to monitor Libyan flights and 
the AWACS remained to take part in the first Bright Star. AWACS returned to Egypt 
in March-April 1984 to monitor Libyan flights toward Sudan after an incident in 
which a Libyan plane allegedly bombed Khartoum. On August 1 1,2003, the United 
States announced that it was canceling the October 2003 Bright Star exercise because 
U.S. armed forces were over-committed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other areas. 
Bright Star exercises are currently underway with over 9,000 U.S. troops 
reportedly participating. 
"Desert Storm". In the week prior to the August 2, 1990, Lraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, President Mubarak traveled to Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia in an attempt 
to negotiate a peaceful end to the crisis. After the invasion, Mubarak advised 
President Bush to withhold sending armed forces to allow Egypt more time to work 
out a peaceful resolution. On August 7, when the United States announced that it was 
deploying troops to Saudi Arabia, Mubarak denied a U.S. request to allow U.S. 
forces use of Egyptian military bases on their way to the Arabian Peninsula so that 
he would have time to negotiate (he later granted the request). Mubarak and other 
Egyptian officials continued their peacemaking efforts in the Arab League, the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and through personal contacts and 
visits with Arab leaders. On August 10, Egypt voted for an Arab League resolution 
to send armed forces to defend Saudi Arabia against a possible Iraqi invasion. The 
first contingent of Egyptian troops, a commando unit and a paratrooper unit, joined 
44 According to the report, an estimated 97% of Egyptian women who have ever been 
married had undergone FGM. See U. S. State Department, Country Report on Human Rights 
Practices: Egypt, February 2005. Available at [http://www.state.govlgldrl/rlslhrrpt/ 
200414 1720.html. 
j5 Human Rights Watch, "Divorced from Justice: Women's Unequal Access to Divorce in 
Egypt,"June 2004. Available online at [http:llhnv.org/reportsl2004/egypt1204/]. 
U.S. forces along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border the next day, on August 1 I. Egypt stated 
that its forces would assist in liberating Kuwait but would not attack or occupy Iraq. 
In February 1991, an Egyptian reinforced infantry division of some 30,000 troops 
took part in Desert Storm, advancing into western Kuwait in a corridor between U.S. 
Marines to the east and U.S. Army forces to the west in Iraq. Egypt suffered 9 killed 
and 74 wounded in action in Desert Storm.46 
Egyptian and U.S. military officers state that cooperation in Bright Star 
exercises facilitated the U.S.-Egyptian cooperation and military compatibility in 
Desert Storm, and Egyptian officers claim that Bright Star and Desert Storm serve 
as precedents for future U.S.-Egyptian cooperative ventures. Moreover, Egyptian 
participation in Desert Storm provided benefit to the U.S.-led operation in that it 
helped broaden the allied coalition that liberated Kuwait. Later, Egyptian troops 
served as peacekeeping forces in Somalia and Yugoslavia. 
Intelligence Cooperation. Although it is difficult to discern the extent of 
U.S.-Egyptian intelligence cooperation, there is a sense among many U.S. security 
officials that Egypt's long struggle against domestic Islamic radicals has made it a 
valuable partner in the global war on terrorism. Since the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks, there have been several reports suggesting that the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency has deported several suspected A1 Qaeda operatives to Egypt 
(along with other Arab countries) in order to be interr~gated.~~ In May, Egyptian 
Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif said the United States has dispatched 60 to 70 Egyptian 
detainees to their home country since the September 11 attacks.48 More recently, an 
Italian prosecutor has asked a judge to issue arrest warrants for 13 Americans 
accused of kidnaping an Egyptian cleric off the streets of Milan and bringing him to 
Egypt in 2003. The cleric reportedly has been held in prison for more than two years 
without formal charges, though Egyptian officials have accused him of having ties 
to Jamaah ~ s l a m i ~ a . ~ ~  
46 On September 14, 1990, then President George H.W. Bush asked Congress to transfer 
Egypt's $6.7 billion military debt from the Federal Financing Bank of the Treasury 
Department to the Department of Defense, and to cancel the debt. President Bush was 
rewarding Egypt for cooperating with the Desert Shield operations against the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait and was relieving Egypt ofpart of its debt repayment burden. Section 592 of P.L. 
101-5 13, signed into law onNovember 5,1990, provided for canceling Egypt's military debt 
to the United States. 
47 This practice is known as "extraordinary rendition." "US ships A1 Qaeda Suspects to Arab 
States,"Christian Science Monitor, July 26, 2002. 
48 "Abductee Still Jailed, Lawyer Says; Egyptian Cleric Was Seized in Milan in Alleged CIA 
Action," Washington Post, July 2 1,2005. 
49 Ibid. 
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt 
Since 1979, Egypt has been the second largest recipient, after Israel, of U.S. 
foreign assistance, receiving an annual average of over $2 billion in economic and 
military aid. Congress typically earmarks foreign assistance for Egypt in the foreign 
operations appropriations bill. The annual earmark has included a statement that 
Egypt should undertake further economic reforms in addition to reforms taken in 
previous years. 
Economic Aid 
Annual bilateral economic assistance to Egypt is typically provided in three 
different ways: (1) as a direct cash transfer to the Egyptian government; (2) as part 
of the Commodity Import Program, which provides hard currency to the Egyptian 
private sector to purchase U.S. agricultural goods; and (3) as funds for USAID 
programming in Egypt. In recent years, Congress has sought to specify how Egypt's 
economic aid would be spent, prioritizing funding for USAID's democracy and 
education programs. Egypt claims that U.S. assistance programs must be jointly 
negotiated and cannot be unilaterally dictated by the United States. 
U.S. economic assistance to Egypt has been decreasing since 1998, when the 
United States began reducing economic assistance to Egypt and Israel. In January 
1998, Israeli officials negotiated with the United States to reduce economic aid and 
increase military aid over a 10-year period. A 3 to 2 ratio similar to U.S. aid to Israel 
and Egypt was applied to the reduction in aid ($60 million reduction for Israel and 
$40 million reduction for Egypt), but Egypt has not received an increase in military 
assistance. Economic aid has dropped in annual $40 million increments from $815 
million in FY 1998 to $495 million in ESF for the FY2006 request5' 
Military Aid 
The Administration has requested $1.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) for Egypt in FY2006 - the same amount as in FY2005. Almost all of Egypt's 
FMF is committed to payments on a $3.2 billion arms agreement with the United 
States, through which Egypt purchased 24 F-16 aircraft, 200 M-1 tanks, and a Patriot 
missile battery. Egypt also receives excess defense articles worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars annually from the Pentagon. 
In addition to large amounts of annual U.S. military assistance, Egypt also 
benefits from certain aid provisions that are available to only a few other countries. 
Since 2000, Egypt's FMF funds have been deposited in an interest bearing account 
in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and have remained there until they are 
obligated. By law (P.L. 106-280), Congress must be notified if any of the interest 
accrued in this account is obligated. Most importantly, Egypt is allowed to set aside 
50 Egypt has periodically received supplemental aid. The FY2003 Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-1 1) included $300 million in ESF for Egypt, which could be 
used to cover the costs of up to $2 billion in loan guarantees. The loan guarantees are to be 
issued over three years. 
FMF funds for current year payments only, rather than set aside the full amount 
needed to meet the full cost of multi-year purchases. Cash flow financing allows 
Egypt to negotiate major arms purchases with U.S. defense suppliers. 
Recent U.S. Military Sales to Egypt. As stated earlier, Egypt uses its FMF 
funds to purchase U.S. defense equipment. By law, Congress must be notified of any 
new purchase agreement. Israel has protested U.S. sales of certain military 
technologies to Egypt; the Egyptians insist that all U.S. weaponry is used for 
defensive purposes and is intended to upgrade or replace its aging Soviet hardware. 
The Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), is 
charged with managing U.S. arms sales to Egypt. Recent sales include 
0 On July29,2005, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified 
Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Egypt of 200 
M 1 O9A5 155mm self-propelled howitzers as well as associated 
equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, 
could be as high as $18 1 million. 
U.S. Assistance to Egypt: Possible Changes 
Some lawmakers believe that U.S. assistance to Egypt has not been effective in 
promoting political and economic reform and that foreign assistance agreements 
should be renegotiated to include benchmarks that Egypt would need to meet to 
continue to qualify for U.S. foreign aid. Others have periodically called for 
restrictions on U.S. aid to Egypt based on the allegations that Egypt indirectly 
supports Palestinian terrorism, suppresses its own population, including minority 
Christians, and continues to allow Egyptian state-owned media outlets to publish 
unsubstantiated conspiratorial theories regarding Israel and the Jewish people. 
The Administration and Egyptian government assert that reducing Egypt's 
military aid would undercut peace between Israel and Egypt. Overall, many U.S. 
observers believe that U.S. support for Egypt stabilizes the region and extends U.S. 
influence in the most populous Arab country. Supporters of continued U.S. assistance 
note that Egypt helps train Iraqi and Palestinian security forces, cooperates with the 
U.S. military, and will be helping to patrol the Egyptian-Gaza border after Israel's 
withdrawal. 
An amendment offered on July 15, 2004, to the House FY2005 foreign 
operations bill (H.R. 481 8) would have reduced U.S. military aid to Egypt by $570 
million and increased economic aid by the same amount, but the amendment failed 
by a vote of 13 1 to 287. More recently, an amendment offered on June 28,2005 to 
the House FY2006 foreign operations bill (H.R. 3057) would have reduced U.S. 
military aid to Egypt by $750 million and would have transferred that amount to child 
survival and health programs managed by USAID. The amendment failed by a 
recorded vote of 87 to 326. 
H.R. 3057, the House FY2006 foreign operations bill, earmarks $100 million 
in ESF for good governance and education programs in Egypt, a doubling ofprevious 
obligated amounts. The Senate version provides $35 million for democracy and 
governance programs in Egypt. 
H.R. 2601, the FY2006lFY2007 House Foreign Relations Authorization bill, 
would reduce U.S. military assistance to Egypt by $240 million over the next three 
fiscal years, while using the same amount of funds to promote economic changes, 
fight poverty, and improve education in Egypt. There is no companion provision in 
the Senate's Foreign Relations Authorization bill (S. 600). Section 535 of H.R. 2601 
would establish a number of requirements Egypt would have to meet in order to 
continue receiving U.S. economic assistance. It also would make cash flow financing 
benefits available only for projects focused on economic reform, education, and 
poverty reduction rather than for military purchases. Finally, H.R. 2601 would 
transfer any interest earned from amounts in an interest bearing account for Egypt's 
FMF to the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) for reform-oriented 
programming in Egypt. 
Table 2. Recent U.S. Aid to Egypt 
(millions of dollars) 
Notes: FY2004 totals reflect the .59% across-the-board reduction. The 
Administration has requested $1.3 billion in FMF, and $495 million in ESF 
for FY2006. 
Year 
Total 
Military Economic 
28969.2 
IMET Total 
32735.4 36.1 61740.7 
Table 3. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt, 1946-1997 
(millions of dollars) 
Notes: 
Totals may not add due to rounding. 
No U.S. aid programs for years 1947, 1949, 1950, 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1971. 
P.L. 480 I1 Grant for 1993 includes $2.1 million in Sec. 416 food donations. 
I.M.E.T. 
UNRWA 
Surplus 
Tech Asst 
Narc. 
D. A. 
ESF 
P.L. 480 1 
P.L. 480 I1 
P 
= Transition Quarter; change from June to September fiscal year 
= less than $1 00,000 
= International Military Education and Training 
= United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
= Surplus Property 
= Technical Assistance 
= International Narcotics Control 
= Development Assistance 
= Economic Support Funds 
= Public Law 480 (Food for Peace), Title I Loan 
= Public Law 480 (Food for Peace), Title I1 Grant 
= Preliminary 
